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The decline in the value of US dollar and the emergence of other currencies has 
opened the debate within OPEC, of whether it is possible to resort to the pricing of 
crude  oil  in  alternative  currencies.  The  debate  was  limited  because  of  the 
inadequate  liquidity  of  most  other  currencies.  In  this  paper,  we  focus  on  the 
implications of the shift in the pricing of Iran’s crude oil to other currencies than 
the US dollar. The results demonstrated that the pricing for Iranian oil in US dollar 
had  high  reaction  potential  and  responded  moderately  to  the  change  in  the 
exchange rate, when compared to the pricing in Euro and in Yen. Consequently, it 
appeared that  stability on the financial market  led  to  partial stability in  the oil 
market. 
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1- Introduction 
 
Since oil prices are contracted in US dollars and oil-exporting nations also imported their 
goods from other countries in addition to the United States, a strong dollar will therefore 
increase the real oil price and a weak dollar will decrease it. A decline in the value of the 
dollar will weaken an oil exporter’s purchasing power (Evans 1986) since it effectively 
makes imports originating from outside the US more expensive, which will lead to oil 
being cheaper outside of United States.  
 
Several studies have empirically examined the impact of a decline in the value of the 
dollar on the purchasing power of oil exporting countries. Dailami (1982), Massood, Arul 
and Mohana (2003) showed that when oil exporting nations purchased a large share of 
their import needs from outside USA, as well as for those that invested a large share of 
their  reserves  in  US  dollar and dollar denominated assets,  they  experienced  losses  in 
purchase power. On one hand, Houghton (1991) argued that a declining dollar was not a 
factor in the reduction of purchasing power of OPEC revenues because prices reflected 
demand and supply and therefore tended to be at an equilibrium state after time. While on 
the other hand, Evans (1986) focused on the issue of oil price stability and its role in 
maintaining the purchasing power of OPEC’s oil revenues. 
 
 It has become of general preoccupation within OPEC members to determine whether to 
continue the pricing of crude oil in US dollar or to shift to an alternative currency, in 
respect of their oil income volatility and uncertainty, as well as their import expenses. 
Despite a slight leniency of OPEC members in believing that a currency basket would 
help  maintain their purchasing power
4, this debate has indeed not led to  any definite 
results yet. Many countries have expressed various reasons for pricing crude oil in an 
alternative currency;  Europeans  for instance  adopted  their  own currency,  the chinese, 
Japanese and Arab oil exporting countries aim to protect themselves from the depreciation 
of the US dollar and Russians base their reasons on trade relationships. Only the British 
find themselves somewhat pulled apart by their strategic partnership with the US and their 
                                                 
4 The currency basket pricing for oil remained unenforceable because Saudi Arabia is still refusing the pricing 
in currencies other than the dollar  in regards to the agreement with the U.S. in 1971.   3 
natural pull from Europe. However, how solid will their century old partnership stand 
against frictions induced by an unstable dollar?  
 
Despite  voluminous  studies  on  this  subject,  the  question  of  whether  and  how  an  oil 
currency basket would affect the oil market volatility appears to not have been studied 
much. Hence, the main objectives of this paper
5: first, identify the volatility of the oil 
reference prices and analyze the impact of dollar fluctuations on the purchasing power of 
Iran. Second, propose a currency basket for Iranian oil and analyze its impact on the oil 
market volatility. 
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.   Section 2 presents the oil currency 
basket model. Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 presents the empirical results and 
section 5 concludes. 
 
2- Currency dilemma and oil currencies basket policy 
 
Analysis  of  the  shift  in  the  pricing  of  oil  would  require  focusing  on  two  groups  of 
countries and two different markets (Samii, Rajamanikam and Thirunavukkarasu 2005). 
As shown in figure1 below, changes arising in any of the five components making up the 
two-country-group market system would impact on other components, so would any new 
external shock.  
 
Different levels of interaction are identified as illustrated in Figure1. In the innermost 
level, fluctuations of US exchange rate affect oil prices. A decrease in the value of the 
dollar will weaken an oil exporter’s purchasing power since it effectively makes imports 
originating from outside the US more expensive, hence rendering oil cheaper outside US 
and initiating an increased demand in those countries (Allen 1979)
6. This instability in the 
oil market is transferred to the financial market through the means of fluctuating demand 
and supply of dollar, which would again feed into the dynamics of t he oil market. In the 
                                                 
5 Liquidity not being our interest in this paper, we nevertheless consider it as a hypothesis. 
6 Verleger (2003) showed that even in the case of a stable nominal price, a decrease in the dollar value would 
worsen the situation for OPEC because they buy a large share of their goods and services from non US 
suppliers that deal in euro or yen.   4 
middle level, oil exporting countries are added to the oil market-Financial market loop, 
since they react to the fluctuations of the US dollar in the financial market which alters 
the price of oil.  In the outermost level, the reserves composition of almost all of OPEC is 
expressed in US dollar, and yet, losses resulting from the dollar movements would not be 
equal from one group of country to the other (Dailami 1982). For those members who 
purchase a large share of their import needs from outside the USA as well as for those 
that invest a large share of their reserves in US dollar, this loss is more flagrant. Finally, 
number  of  OPEC  members  have  large  debts.  Fluctuations  in  exchange  rates  strongly 
influence each country’s life standards. 
 
 
Figure 1: model of two groups of countries and two different markets 
 
 
Hence, the most favourable choice of currency in regards to oil pricing would be one that 
takes into account the following condition: minimize the currency exposure losses, which 
translates to minimizing the gap between oil revenues and import expenses. 
   5 
In order to determine oil prices reactions, we extend this definition of exposure to OPEC, 
where exports and imports are unequal. For simplicity purpose, we consider the case of 
one member country trading (Iran)
7 with three partners United States, European Union 
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O X represent the oil exported to the USA, EU, and Japan 
respectively, then the foreign currency revenue to the exporting country can be expressed 
as
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g M  represent the goods imported from USA, EU and Japan 
respectively then the foreign currency payment to the importing country can be expressed 
as
US
g P . The currency exposure for the OPEC country (Iran) under dollar pricing of crude 
oil is derived as follows: 
 
Currency Exposure = Foreign currency revenue – Foreign currency expense 
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represent the variations of exchange rate,  t us e ,  is the effective exchange rate of the dollar 
in terms of other major  currencies, pt  is  the  domestic  price  index  pertaining  to  the 
importing countries, then the actual loss related to currency exposure for the exporting 
country (Iran) in its local currency is given as: 
 
















P R  *       (2) 
The alternative scenario proposed was that of oil being priced in a currency basket. In this 
case, the actual loss depends on the nature of each currency: a) the external balance: 
deficit in USA, quite equilibrium in Europe and excess in Japan. b) The nature of the 
exchange rate regime for each of these currencies. c) The distance and the national border. 
For these reasons, many countries diversified their foreign reserve holdings in order to 
                                                 
7 Iran happens to be the only oil exporting country where oil trade is expressed in many currencies: 65% in 
Euro, 20% in dollar and 15% in Yen.   6 
protect  themselves  against  the  depreciation  of  the  dollar
8. This  diversification  step  is 
hence accompanied by a shift in the oil payment system,  as was announced by  Iran in 
2003,  which  also  implied   the  payment  for  oil  in  Euro
9  (Venezuela  accepted  the 
contracting of oil in euro, Ramirez R. (2007))
 10.  
 
Therefore, the actual loss to the OPEC member (Iran) in terms of local currency against 
the proposed currency basket is: 
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 represent the variations in the exchange rate of 
each currency. The OPEC member (Iran) would then have to choose the currencies such 
that the loss to currency exposure is minimized, that is: 
 

















































































P R Min    * , * , *  7) 
 
 
                                                 
8 the central banks reduced the dollar share of their reserves. For instance, 70% of china’s reserves are made 
up of dollar and the rest of Euro and Yen, For  India it’s a share of 65% in dollar, 13% in euro and the rest in 
Sterling and Yen, the Japanese foreign reserves surpassed 1 trillion $ blend of dollar and of euro. 
9 Iran is cutting its US dollar reserves to less than 20% of total foreign currencies holdings, and will buy more 
euros and yen as tensions with the US increase, Central Bank Governor Ebrahim Said, March 2007.  
10 Recently at a summit of OPEC heads of state in Riyad in Nov 2007, Iran and Venezuela suggested a basket 
of currencies including with the dollar, the Euro, the Yen and the Yuan, but the failed to win over the 
remaining member states. (Altman D. 2007)   7 
3- Data description 
 
Before undertaking a statistical analysis, we shall describe the data used in this paper. Our 
dataset consists of daily observations over the time period of January 1
st 1999 to end of 
December 2007, of real effective exchange rate of the dollar index (EERD), real effective 
exchange rate of the Euro index (EERE) as well as that of the Japanese Yen (EERY). The 
real index of effective exchange rate is the price adjusted major currencies indices of 
Dollar, Euro and Yen, respectively.  The oil price series is the US dollar daily spot price 
of  Iranian  oil  reference  (Iran  light)  deflated  by  the  US  consumer  price  index.  The 
variables  are  used  in  logarithmic  form.  The  data  employed  are  taken  from  Federal 
Reserves,  European  Central  Bank,  OPEC  organization,  Bank  of  Japan,  Energy 
Information Administration (EIA), World Trade Organization (WTO), Organization for 
Economic co-operation and Development –World Statistical Resources- (OECD). 
 
4- Empirical results 
 
We start our empirical examination by investigating for presence of unit roots in our 
series, by employing the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test (1981). The results are presented 
in table 1. Akaike’s information criterion is used to select the appropriate lag lengths. For 
all series, we are unable to reject the unit root null hypothesis in level. 
 
Table 1: unit root test of ADF (1981) 
 
    Dollar    euro    yen    Iran         
Level   -1.37               0.39    -1.19    1.82   
Frst diff  -48.35
*            -48.78
*    -47.28
*            -47.07
* 
 
* Rejection the null hypothesis of test at 5% significant level. 
 
The correlation coefficients between the three currencies are also computed and reported 
in table 2. We observe that there is high correlation amongst  effective  exchange rate 
series over the sample period, the smallest value being a 0.65 coefficient value between 
yen and dollar. Table 3 shows that oil price series appear to be perfectly correlated. It also 
shows that despite the higher correlation between euro and dollar exchange rates, Yen   8 
based oil pricing exhibits higher correlation with dollar oil pricing (0.99) than that of the 
euro pricing (0.98). 
 
Table 2: Effective Exchange rate correlations                     Table 3: Correlations of oil prices 
                   EERD   EERE      EERY                                               IranC$        Iran€        Iran¥ 
EERD   1                                                                     Iran$        1 
EERE       -0.92     1                                             Iran€      0.96                  1 
EERY         0.65   -0.71         1                              Iran ¥      0.99               0.96                1 
 
 
We used Iran price reference of crude oil priced in the three currencies. Table 4 and 5 
compute  the  volatility  of  Iran’s  reference  priced  in  different  currencies  and  that  of 
exchange rate of Dollar, Euro and Yen. One can see that the exchange rate of the dollar 
and the yen appears to be more volatile than the exchange rate of the euro by 27.9% and 
29.1% respectively over sample period; hence, it is only natural that euro priced oil be 
less volatile than those in Dollar and Japanese Yen.   
 
       Table 4: volatility of Iran reference pricing in 3 currencies     Table 5: Volatility of Exchange rate 
                Iran $               Iran €               Iran ¥                                          Dollar          Euro         Yen            
  Volty
*      0.5                  0.38                    0.51                           Volty        0.118            0.085       0.12 
* Volatility=Standard Deviation/Mean 
 
Consequently, from this analysis, euro pricing appears to be less volatile and suitable 
against the Japanese yen and the dollar. At its’ birth in 2000, clear evidence of the euro 
standing out as a competitive currency was not available, but over time, it has definitely 
been able to prove itself as being strong and disposing of it’s own force as indicated by 
various important signs relevant to the hard European economic indices. The stability of 
these economic indices reflects through an equilibrium state of the currency level. 
 
In order to verify outcomes of the scenario pertaining to the proposed hypothesis of oil 
pricing based on a currency basket, we proceed to the examination of trade relationships 
between two groups of countries: the importers and exporters of oil.   9 
For this reason, we consider a sample of trade relationships between Iran, United States, 
European Union and Japan. The statistics show that trade flows or business relationships 
are more important between  Iran and Japan or the European Union, compared to that of 
trade with the US. This is reflected through the important volumes of trade relationship 
between the tree countries, with the EU, Iran’s main trading partner, holding 27.8% of 
total market share, followed by china at 15.6% and Japan holding 9.8% of total market 
share. On another hand, there appears to be a wide discrepancy in oil exports from Iran to 
the world, with higher shares to EU and Japan as compared to USA as well as larger 
imports from EU and Japan. In 2006, Iran exports to EU totaled up to 14.12 billion Є 
(88%  energy)  and  those  to  Japan  totaled  more  than  $15.109  billion  (90%  energy), 
whereas the value of Iranian imports from EU was more than 11.19 billion euro and 
imports from Japan were more than 1.045 billion dollar.  Consequently, trade balance 
between Iran and EU resulted in a Є2.935 billion surplus as well as a $14.064 billion 
surplus in the relationship with Japan
11. 
 
Given these  circumstances, the issue that one   must address  is  knowing  whether the 
revenue from oil exports to USA, EU and Japan adequa tely compensates for the goods 
and services imports from these regions respectively.  We first considered the existi ng 
scenario of oil being priced in US dollars. If Iran imports a major share of its needs from 




Table 6: Iran currency exposure and reserves in 2006 
 
                         CE (Billion)            Loss (Million)                      Reserves (Billion)         Loss (Million) 
   
US dollar                   23                              361                                     52                               832 
        
 
 
If, on the contrary, Iran import needs originate from non-dollar areas, then it becomes 
necessary to convert this revenue to cover for import costs.  As the value of the dollar is 
subject to uncertainty, the purchasing power of dollar revenues also becomes unstable. 
                                                 
11 The statistics are from the United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics Database and from worldwide statistical 
resources of OECD.   10 
Table 6 shows that Iran’s losses in currency exposure mounts up to 361 million dollars, 
while losses in the Iranian foreign reserves are of 832 million dollars due to the decline of 
the value of US dollar currency in 2006. Therefore, a decrease in the dollar value would 
worsen the situation since Iran buys a large share of its goods and services from outside 
USA. 
 
As for the alternative scenario of oil being priced in other currency than the dollar, and 
also with diversified Iranian foreign reserves, every thing else being equal, what would be 
the impact on oil market volatility? 
 
Table 7: Currencies Exposure of Iranian trade                
                             Currency Exposure        balance (Million) 
Dollar (Million)               77                       1,232 Loss 
Euro (Billion)                2,929                     22 Wins 
Yen (Billion)                797332                   73354 Loss 
 
 
We  suppose  that  Iran  implements  a  new  payment  system  for  oil  –  meaning  that  it 
negotiates  oil  sales  in  currencies  other  than  the  US  dollar  (as  it  was  the  case  with 
Venezuela in 2008 for instance). In counter part, import bills are covered in the currency 
of each country. We observe from table 7 that the Iranian currency exposure benefits from 
the appreciation of the euro, which partially covers losses resulting from the depreciation 
of the Dollar and the Yen in 2006. This equilibrium in the purchasing power would be 
able to stand out as a partial stability of the oil market. 
 
 
Table 8: Iranian reserves depend on the oil trade in strange currencies in 2006                
                               Reserves (Billion)        Results (Million) 
Dollar (20%)               10.4                       166 Loss 
Euro (60%)                 24                          185 Wins 
Yen (15%)                 709218                 83464 Loss 
 
   11 
Another possibility of addressing the question would be by computing the influence of the 
devaluation of exchange rate on the purchasing power of Iran. The Iranian reserve of 
foreign currencies was of 52.3 billion dollar in 2006
12. Currency exposure of reserves is 
determined by working out the percentage of Iranian oil sales in the various currencies. It 
appears that  60% sales were made in Euro, 20% in dollar and 15% in Japanese Yen. 
Inference arising form  results enclosed in table 8 is that the reason that pushed many 
countries to diversify their foreign reserves holdings is primarily to protect themselves 
against the decline in the value of the US dollar. 
 
Hence,  using  equation  (7),  losses  due  to  currency exposure  is computed  under the 
alternative of dollar, euro and yen pricing.  It appears that when oil is priced in dollars, 
Iran’s loss in the purchasing power is of -1.6% of the dollar exports share for the year 
2006 and when priced in yen the loss is of -9.2% of the yen exports share. However, the 
pricing in euro leads to surplus in purchasing power of 0.75% of the euro exports share in 
the same year. Hence, it appears wise to choose the pricing currency such that the loss to 
currency exposure is minimized. 
 
In order to verifying the above results, we estimate the reactions of oil prices subsequent 
to changes in exchange rate as well as to changes in price levels in different currencies. 
Table 9 presents estimation results of exchange rate mark-up elasticities and the reaction 
of price elasticities in various currency pricing. The results reveal that the statistics are 
significant at a 10% significance level and carry the expected negative signs for exchange 
rate of the dollar and for yen, while carrying a positive sign for euro. The export price 
mark-up elasticity estimates range from -0.17 for dollar pricing to 0.02 for euro pricing. 
For a 10% depreciation of the effective exchange rate of the US dollar during the sample 
period, export prices have been leveled by 1.7% to partially recoup the decline in the 
purchasing power of oil revenues while the Iranian export prices of oil in Japanese yen 
have  been  marked-up  by  0.56%.  On  the  other  hand,  for  a  10%  appreciation  of  the 
effective exchange rate of the euro, export prices exhibit a surplus of 0.2%, we notice that 
dollar and Yen pricing for oil have a negative impact and appear to be more volatile than 
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the  euro  pricing.  Despite  higher  volatility  of  dollar  pricing  compared  to  that  of  euro 
pricing, we observe from table 9 that the  potential reaction of Iranian oil priced in US 
dollar responds moderately to changes in exchange rate, whereas it is not case for Euro 
and Yen pricing. This result may be due to the strong confidence in the US economy and 
global trust in the US currency. 
 
Table 9: the OLS estimation for Iranian oil is priced by Dollar, Euro and Yen. 
t i t i
i
t i i t i P VOL P , ,             
                         Constant                   
*              oildollar                   oileuro                  oilyen                   
2 R  
 
 Iran Oil $               0.003               -0.17                                         0.49                   0.46                 0.96 
(P-value)                (0.46)              (0.00)                                       (0.00)                 (0.00) 
Iran Oil Є              - 0.007              0.02                  0.96                                           0.03                 0.93 
(P-value)                (0.50)              (0.09)               (0.10)                                         (0.07) 
Iran Oil Ұ               0.176              -0.056                0.97                 0.02                                           0.93 
(P-value)                (0.89)              (0.98)                (0.00)             (0.10) 
       *  is the mark-up of effective exchange rate of dollar, Euro and Yen. The results are significant at 10% levels 
 
 
      5- Conclusion 
 
Confronted  to  the  fluctuations  of  oil  revenues  purchasing  power  of  OPEC  members, 
induced by the variability of the value of the US dollar, we are led to believe that taking 
on a different pricing scheme would yield a more stable market circumstance and trade 
outcomes. Hence, focusing on the two alternate pricing methods of crude oil for export 
purpose, we compared dollar based oil pricing to a currency-basket pricing scenario and 
reached two main interesting conclusions: 
 
First, the decline in the value of US dollar leads to losses in the purchasing power of a 
barrel of oil of exporting countries (Iran). Our measures led to determine that when priced 
in dollar the loss for Iran as a whole is -1.6% of dollar export shares, and when priced in 
yen the loss is -9.5% of Yen export shares, whereas benefits from euro pricing is 0.75% 
of the euro export shares. Hence, it would result in a disadvantage for countries whose 
major trading partner is the USA. 
 
Second, the results of the currency basket-pricing hypothesis suggest that dollar pricing 
and Yen pricing are more volatile than euro pricing for Iranian oil. Despite that US dollar   13 
price of oil appears more volatile and more uncertain, its potential reaction to changes of 
other price references included in the currency basket, is of more moderate temperament, 
whereas Euro and Yen pricing exhibit large responses. 
 
We conclude that the price calculated in currency basket would display more stability in 
terms of economic development and oil markets conjuncture. However, few drawbacks 
arose  from  these  observations.  Namely,  how  realistic  is  the  implementation  of  this 
currency-basket pricing?  Is there proper and adequate liquidity supply of currencies in 
the financial market? Would Europeans and the Japanese be willing to accept the pricing 
of oil in their currencies and what impact would it have on their economies? To respond 
to  these  questions,  one  must  carry  out  more  investigations  on  monetary  situations  of 
Europe and Japan. 
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